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Price determination in a competitive industry 
with costly information and a production lag 
Reuven Glick* 
and 
Clas Wihlborg** 
We analyze the role of information for price and output adjustment when competitive 
firms with rational expectations cannot directly distinguish between industrywide and firm- 
specific cost disturbances. Firms may become informed about industrywide cost conditions 
by acquiring information at a cost. The sensitivity of price and output to cost disturbances 
decreases as more firms choose to purchase information. The equilibrium industry share 
of informed firms increases as the cost of information falls and total cost variability 
increases. The equilibrium share of informed firms is largest when there is a comparable 
degree of variability in both industrywide and firm-specific costs. 
1. Introduction 
a In this article we examine price and output adjustment within a competitive industry 
in the presence of uncertainty about firm-specific and industrywide cost conditions. We 
formulate a model in which individual firms can directly observe their own, but not 
industrywide, cost conditions, and may only acquire information about industrywide 
conditions at a cost. An important element of our analysis concerns how the availability 
of this costly information influences market equilibrium. 
The distinction between local and aggregate conditions is a property that characterizes 
so-called island models suggested originally by Phelps (1970). Such models generally 
assume that information about aggregate conditions is not available to individual agents 
at the time they maximize their objective functions. Lucas (1972, 1973, 1975) posits that 
agents cannot determine whether prices increase because of island-specific or economywide 
demand conditions. Other models (Mortensen, 1970; Grossman and Weiss, 1982; 
Frydman, 1982) emphasize limited information about local and aggregate cost conditions. 
Our model belongs to the latter category, although our analysis is easily extended to 
include confusion about local and aggregate demand conditions. We go beyond these 
articles by presuming the availability of costly information. 
* New York University. 
** University of Southern California. 
We are grateful for comments from Roman Frydman and Robert Trevor as well as from participants in 
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There are two essential features to our model. First, firms make production decisions 
before determination of the market equilibrium price. Since goods production is typically 
a time-consuming process, this assumption of a production lag is a realistic one for many 
industries. Because of the lag, individual firms must form expectations about the industry 
market-clearing price at the time they determine output.' This price depends on aggregate 
output in the industry. In our model uncertainty about industrywide cost conditions 
underlies uncertainty about aggregate output. For example, wage and productivity 
conditions may vary among competing firms and make information about average 
conditions important. 
The other essential feature of our analysis is that firms may choose to be informed 
by acquiring information about industrywide costs. The role of costly information for 
market adjustment has previously been addressed by Darby (1976) and Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980). Using a general framework where information is costly, Darby analyzes 
how heterogeneous expectations may exist in an equilibrium characterized by individually 
rational expectations. By specifying particular distribution functions for random distur- 
bances and a supply and demand structure, we are able to relate equilibrium price and 
output adjustment explicitly to the characteristics of the distribution functions. Grossman 
and Stiglitz (1980) introduce an information market into a financial asset-pricing model 
with risk-averse investors. They point to an important externality of information acquisition: 
the larger the share of investors that purchase information, the less is the incentive for 
others to do so. We obtain a similar externality result, although for different reasons. 
In Section 2 we specify a model of a competitive industry of risk-neutral, expected- 
profit-maximizing firms. We then derive the equilibrium industry price and output levels 
in terms of cost and other structural parameters, while assuming that the share of 
informed firms in the industry is exogenous. 
Section 3 describes determination of equilibrium in the information market. We 
derive the equilibrium share of informed firms under circumstances that rule out "free- 
rider" problems. We analyze how this share depends on the cost of information, 
industrywide relative to firm-specific cost variability, and total cost variability. We show 
that the share of informed firms is greatest when the variability of both firm-specific and 
industrywide cost conditions is relatively high and when information is relatively cheap. 
Section 4 analyzes how the response of equilibrium price and output to cost and 
demand disturbances depends on parameters influencing the purchase of information. 
Two interesting results are that the price is relatively insensitive to a cost disturbance 
when either total cost variability is relatively high or the degrees of variability of firm- 
specific and industrywide cost conditions are comparable. 
Section 5 contains conclusions and possible extensions of our research. 
2. Equilibrium in the goods market 
* In this section we formulate a simple model of firms in a competitive industry. 
Individual firms' decisions concerning the supply of output are made at the beginning of 
a given period. The equilibrium price that then clears the goods market is determined at 
the end of the period. In this section we treat the share of firms that have chosen to 
purchase information as exogenous. 
The supply side of the goods market consists of n firms, all producing the same 
homogeneous good, where n is assumed to be exogenous and a very large number. Each 
firm i possesses the following quadratic production cost function: 
' We implicitly assume that output is not storable. In another paper (Glick and Wihlborg, 1984) we 
develop a model in which inventory adjustment and information purchase are possible. 
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Ci = CJ[y] = Y + kiyig i= 1,..., , (1) 
where Ci = the cost of producing quantity of output yi; ki = the realization of a random 
cost-condition term observed by the firm at the time production decisions are made; and 
z = a scale parameter assumed equal to I/n.2 
The demand side of the goods market is given exogenously by the following aggregate 
demand function: 
P = a - bY+ u, (2) 
where P = the end-of-period goods market price; Y = the aggregate quantity of output 
n 
supplied (Y = y i); u = an end-of-period realization of a random demand term; and 
i= 1 
a and b are positive parameters. 
We assume that the cost-condition realization ki observed by each individual firm is 
given by the sum of a component a, representing industrywide conditions affecting the 
costs of all firms, and a component fi, representing firm-specific cost conditions: 
ki = a+fig i = 1,... ,n. (3) 
a and Ei are generated by independent and normal distribution functions such that 
a - N(ao, ar) and ii - N(O, o ). Each firm's realization ki thus differs from that of other 
firms only by the independent realizations fi. It is assumed that neither a nor Ei may be 
directly observed by firms. The random demand term ii is assumed distributed N(O, a) 
independently of a and i. 
Output levels and the equilibrium price are determined in the model in the following 
way. At the time each firm makes its output decision, it obtains a realization of its cost 
condition parameter ki. While no firm may directly distinguish between the magnitude 
of industrywide cost conditions (a) versus individual cost conditions (ki), it is assumed 
that m firms, 0 c m c n, have acquired information about the current value of a at a 
fixed cost c. The firms which have acquired this information are termed "informed." 
Those that have not are "uninformed." On the basis of their available information, all 
firms then determine how much output to supply to the goods market. At the end of the 
period, the equilibrium price that clears the goods market is determined. In Section 3 we 
determine the equilibrium number, or equivalently the industry share X (=m/n), of 
informed firms. 
Each firm's profit-maximizing output is derived by maximizing expected profits 
conditional on its information set, Si, about current cost conditions. Assuming all firms 
regard themselves as price-takers this may be expressed as 
E[lIifSj] = E[PSi]yi - yi/(2z) - kiyi - ci, i = 1, . .. , n, (4) 
where S, = I, and ci = c for i = 1,. .., m, the informed firms; and S, = U, and ci = O 
for i = m + 1, .. ., n, the uninformed firms. 
The profit-maximizing output for firm i is 
y* = z(E[PIS1]-ki), y* > i = 1, ..., n. (5) 
2 This particular specification of individual firm cost functions has the property that aggregate industry 
marginal costs are independent of the number of firms (n = liz). We neglect, as do most models of competitive 
equilibrium, determination of the equilibrium number of firms and firm size. In Section 3, however, we show 
that the equilibrium share of informed firms in the industry, and hence the equilibrium price, will depend on n. 
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Each firm's output depends positively on its expected price and negatively on its cost 
conditions.3 
Aggregate industry output Y is given by 
n m n 
Y= ylz , P = zi + 2: A* (6) 
i=1 i=I i=m+l 
or, after inserting (5) into (6), by 
m n 
Y = 2: z(E[PlIi]-ki) + '2 z(E[P| Ui]-ki) 
i=I i=m+l 
= PI + (I - X)P - a, (7) 
I m 
where we have assumed that n is sufficiently large that - Ei = 0; and 
ni= 
Pe = the average price expectation of informed firms (-E E[PlII]), 
Pe = the average price expectation of uninformed firms (- m E[Pi Ui]. 
n-mi=m+1 
Substituting aggregate market output Y, as described by (7), into the aggregate market 
demand equation (2) gives the following relation between the equilibrium market price 
and the average price expectations of informed and uninformed firms: 
P=a+ba -bXPe-b(1-X)Pe +u. (8) 
Equation (8) shows that the equilibrium price depends on current industrywide cost (a) 
and demand (u) conditions, on the average price expectations of both informed (Pe) and 
uninformed (Pe ) firms, as well as on the share of informed firms (X). We use the method 
of undetermined coefficients to solve for the equilibrium price for an exogenously given 
level of X. Using this method amounts to "guessing" a solution of the form: 
P = P + B(a a-oe) +ua, (9) 
where P and B depend on the structural parameters of the system in a manner de- 
scribed below. 
For expectations to be consistent with the conjectured equilibrium, the price 
expectations of each firm must take the following form: 
E[PISi] = P + BE[a- alSi], i = 1, ..., n. (10) 
Equation (10) implies that the price expectations of individual firms will differ according 
to their expectations of the industry-cost disturbance (a - a). Since a is known by all 
informed firms, E[a- aSi] = a-a for i = 1, ..., m. 
The uninformed, however, will form expectations of industrywide costs conditional 
on their individual realizations of ki. Assuming that the joint distribution function of ki 
and a is known, it follows that E[a - a-Si] = y(ki - a) for the uninformed firms, 
3We assume that the long-run average price component of each firm's expected price level is sufficiently 
high relative to the realization of its individual costs to rule out negative output levels. Although we have 
assumed that cost conditions are normally distributed, this constraint technically implies corresponding 
constraints on the cost distribution functions that we shall ignore. 
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i = m + 1, ..., n, where y = a 2/(U2 + 2). The parameter y may be interpreted as a 
measure of how well a firm's current observation of ki - -a serves as an estimate of 
a - a. For example, as y tends to 1, the variations in observed ki - 
- depend increasingly 
on variations in industrywide cost conditions. Accordingly, ki - -a serves as a better 
estimate of a - a. As y tends to 0, average industry-cost conditions, a, serve as a better 
estimate of a.4 
The average price expectations of the informed and uninformed are given, respectively, 
by 
P = P+ B(a-a) (Ila) 
and 
PU= + By(a - a-), (lib) 
where in the latter case it is assumed that there is a sufficiently large number of 
uninformed firms such that the average of their ki observations is a. 
Inserting Pe and Pe in (8), collecting terms on a - a, comparing intercept and slope 
coefficients with (9), and using the method of undetermined coefficients imply 
a + bo 
a +b (12) 
b 
1 + b + yb(1-X) (13) 
Substituting (13) back in (9) and (1 a) and in (7) and (1 Ib), respectively, yields the 
following expressions for the equilibrium industry price and output: 
P = P + (blv)(at - a-) + u, (14) 
Y = - -a - (l/v)(a - a-), (15) 
where v = 1 + bX + by(1 - X). The equilibrium price depends on the long-run average 
price (P), current industrywide cost disturbances (a - a), and current demand disturbances 
(u). Equilibrium industry output depends on the long-run average output level (P -a) 
and on current industry cost disturbances. It does not depend on current demand 
conditions, because production decisions are made before the realization of demand 
disturbances and the determination of the equilibrium price. 
The above equilibrium presumes that each firm's information set Si includes the 
structural parameters a-, y, a, and b as well as X.5 
The effects of transitory demand and industrywide cost disturbances on the equilibrium 
price and output are clearly discerned from (14) and (15). A positive transitory demand 
disturbance (u > 0), for example, leads to a rise in price above its average value. A 
transitory increase in current industry-cost conditions above their average level 
(a - - > 0) will lead to a rise in price above P and to a fall in output below P - a. The 
magnitude of the output and price response diminishes as either the share of informed 
firms (X) or the relative variance of industrywide disturbances (y) rises. Intuitively, as 
more firms are informed or as individual cost conditions provide a better guide to 
industrywide cost conditions, the greater is the expectation that the market price will rise 
4 The expectation formations of the uninformed firms may be interpreted as being subject to an error- 
in-variable measurement problem in which the variable a - a is measured by ki - 
- 
with error f, 
(Johnston, 1972, pp. 281-291). 
5Frydman (1982) shows that firms generally cannot learn the structural parameters, and, therefore, a 
rational expectations equilibrium cannot be achieved if firms do not know how others form their expectations. 
He has also shown that if firms know how others form expectations, then convergence to a rational expectation 
equilibrium like ours may occur. 
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in response to what is an industrywide cost increase. Since aggregate output will then 
contract less, the equilibrium price increase is dampened. 
To illustrate the properties of the equilibrium we further analyze the characteristics 
of price forecast errors. Two properties of individually rational price expectations are (i) 
the ex ante forecast error is zero, and (ii) the covariance between the forecast error and 
the price forecast is zero. 
From ( 10) and ( 14) one may derive measures of the price forecast errors of individual 
informed and uninformed firms. We denote these errors as 6, and 3k,, respectively: 
b P - E[PlIj] = u, Il, . . , 9m, (16a) 
5-P - E[PI Uj] = (blv)(a - f-a (ki- a-)) + U, i=m + 19 . . .,In, (16b) 
since 
E[PIIj] = F + (b/v)(a - a-) (17a) 
E[PI U1] = + (b/v)y(ki - a-). (17b) 
It is easily confirmed that for individual informed and uninformed firms, the above 
properties for rational expectations hold. 
3. Equilibrium in the information market 
* The expressions for equilibrium price and output in the goods market derived in the 
previous section depend on the share of firms X (=m/n) that have chosen to acquire 
information about the level of industrywide cost conditions (a). In this section we analyze 
the demand for industrywide cost information and determination of the equilibrium X 
(denoted X*). We do not specify the supply side of the information market in detail, and 
simply assume that each firm can acquire information about the level of a at a fixed cost 
c from an external source.6 
o Determination of the equilibrium share of informed firms (X*). The equilibrium share 
of informed firms (X*) is determined when no uninformed firm can increase its expected 
profits by purchasing information about industrywide costs. We now specify this equilibrium 
condition in more detail. 
Define E[11j Si] as the output-optimized level of expected profits of firm i, where Si 
is the firm's information set after the information purchase decision is made. Formally, 
the expression for E[11I*|Sj] may be obtained by inserting the expressions for the optimal 
output level yi = yi, given by (5), into the expected profit expression E[l11I Se], given by 
(4). Recalling that z = 1/n and rearranging give the following quadratic formula: 
E[H11fSi] = - (E[PISi] -k)2-ci, (18) 
where Si = Ii and ci = c if a firm is informed, i = 1, . . ., m; Si = Uj and ci = O if a firm 
is uninformed, i = m + 1, . . ., n. 
Equilibrium in the information market requires that the mth firm purchasing 
information be indifferent between being informed or uninformed, given its information 
6 The supplier of information can be interpreted as an outside advisory service. The cost of information to 
each firm will correspond only to the cost of transferring information among firms, unless contracts can be made 
to prohibit such transfer. If such contracts cannot be made, then information may not be collected at all unless 
there are many firms' buying information in equilibrium; i.e., unless the number of informed firms m in our 
model is large. The reason is that the original supplier of information must be able to spread its real resource 
costs in collecting and processing the useful information over many purchases. For further discussion of 
equilibrium in information markets, see Demsetz (1969). 
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set at the time the information purchase decision is made (cf. Grossman and Stiglitz, 
1980). This information set, which we denote by Ti, includes the structural parameters 
of the model (a, b, a-, o2, -y). The expected profit of being informed, conditional on Ti, 
is E[E[ll~II*]jT1] - c. The expected profit of remaining uninformed evaluated at the 
same time is E[E[ll|UiUJ Tj]. The incentive to become informed (FT) is the difference 
between these two expectations: 
FT E[E[ll'iIjI]IT  - E[E[H'I Uj] I T - c. (19) 
The difference between the first two terms on the right-hand side of (19) represents 
the expected opportunity cost of remaining uninformed. Thus, the incentive to become 
informed may also be interpreted as the difference between the expected opportunity cost 
of remaining uninformed and the cost of information. 
If firms make their information purchase decision after obtaining knowledge about 
their individual cost conditions, then ki is included in Tj as well. We show in the 
Appendix that a "free-rider" problem may arise in this case. The reason is that with 
knowledge of ki as well as X, the mth firm can costlessly infer (a - a)2, and therefore the 
magnitude (though not the sign) of the industrywide cost disturbance.7 We demonstrate 
that this knowledge affects the mth firm's incentive to purchase information in such a 
way that either no firm or all firms will purchase information about current industrywide 
costs. No firms will purchase information when the current a is relatively small, while all 
firms will purchase information if the current a is relatively large. Thus, if the decision 
to purchase information is made at the time individual cost conditions are known, an 
information market will not exist in all periods. Since the supplier of information 
presumably must cover his fixed costs, it is likely that an information market will not 
exist at all in this case. 
It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that information will be purchasable only before 
firms observe their individual cost conditions.8 The information set T, then contains only 
structural parameters, and will be identical for all firms. In this case evaluation of 
expression (19) with the use of (1 7a), (1 7b), and (18) implies that the incentive to become 
informed is given by' 
The marginal firm cannot evaluate the incentive to being informed unless it knows the number of firms 
that have already purchased information, and therefore X. If the cost of information c were a monotonic function 
of X, the marginal firm could learn X by observation of c. 
' The information supplied could refer to the average skill and/or educational level of labor in the industry. 
This type of information may be available before each firm learns the productivity of its own resources. It must 
be assumed that factor market imperfections prevent firms from learning industrywide cost conditions by 
observing factor prices at the time resources are used. Alternatively, the information could relate to common 
weather conditions affecting firms (i.e., farms) engaged in agriculture. 
To derive (19a), note first that (17a), (17b), and (18) imply 
2nP ki)2 + v2(t- yt2+2P i()a-) 
E[llVJ.Ui] = (a [(F- k)2 + y2(k - a)2 + 2(P - ki)( v)(ka - a)]- 
Substitute in (19) and evaluate expectations conditional on the information set Tj which excludes ki. We obtain 
(19a) by noting that 
E[2(P -kki) v (ak- )Ti] = 0 
E2(P - ki) v y(ki - a-)tT = ? 
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Fi 2n {2( )?} C 1a 
where v = 1 + bX + by(1 - ), Sk = a2 + r2, and y = a2/(U2 + o2). Observe that the 
first term on the right-hand side, the expected opportunity cost of remaining uninformed, 
depends on the variance of individual and relative cost disturbances, but not on the 
expected cost disturbance nor on demand disturbances. The reason is that only the 
variance of anticipated profits associated with cost uncertainty is affected by the degree 
of cost information, and at the time information purchase decisions are made each firm's 
expectation of its individual cost disturbance (ki - a) is zero. 1 
Note also from (19a) that at the time information purchase decisions are made the 
incentive to become informed is the same for all firms. The incentive depends only on 
structural parameters (and on X) and not on firm-specific or time-specific factors. Our 
analysis thus allows us to determine the industry equilibrium share (or number) of 
informed firms and the way in which this share depends on the structural parameters of 
the model, but not the individual firms that are informed.11 
Equilibrium in the information market occurs for 0 < X* < 1 when FT = 0; for 
A* = 0 when FT < 0; and for X* = 1 when FT > 0, for all i. Determination of the level 
of X that solves (19a)-the equilibrium share of informed firms, X*-is described 
graphically in Figure 1. The cost of information is independent of X, and is graphed as a 
horizontal line. The expected opportunity cost of remaining uninformed decreases as X 
increases, however, because the greater the proportion of informed firms, the smaller is 
the difference between the variances of anticipated profit of being uninformed and 
informed, respectively. Recall from the interpretation of (14) and (15) that the price and 
output effects of cost disturbances decrease as more firms are informed. 
Assuming X* lies within the lower bound of 0 and the upper bound of 1, X* is 
determined by the intersection of the two curves. The equilibrium in the information 
market thus determined is stable. For X < X*, the expected opportunity cost of remaining 
uninformed is larger than c, and the proportion of informed firms will increase. 
(a2 ( )2IT1 = 2 a 1 b2 yoj 
E V2k a Y~rc 2nVk. Y0 
Lv2 y(k - t)21T] = 22 
10 Even though firms are risk neutral, the expected profits to being informed and to remaining uninformed 
depend on variances, since output-optimized expected profits are quadratic in expected price and production 
costs. See equation (18). 
" If no external suppliers of relevant information exist, it is possible to assume that firms can become 
informed by investing in one period for a fixed cost in the capability to gather and analyze the desired 
information for the current and all subsequent periods. It can be shown that the share of firms that do so is 
given by a condition that is virtually identical to (19a). 
Define G T as the incentive to invest in information-gathering capability for period 0 and all subsequent 
periods, where 
GT= Eo[ E,[HiI]( + r)| T] - Eo[ EJ[HIU1]( + r)| Ti -Ck 
and E0 is the expectation operator at time 0, T, is the information set that includes only structural parameters, 
and Ck is the one-time fixed investment cost of information-gathering capability. Since E0[EH[HjIII ]TJ] and 
E0[E[HI~*jUj]jTJ] depend only on structural parameters and are independent of time, it is possible to obtain in a 
manner analogous to the derivation of (19a): 
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FIGURE 1 
EQUILIBRIUM IN THE INFORMATION MARKET 
COST OF INFORMATION c 
EXPECTED OPPORTUNITY COST 
OF REMAINING UNINFORMED 
0 1 
The decrease in the expected opportunity cost of being uninformed as X increases 
can be interpreted as a positive externality of information purchase: the incentive for 
each firm to purchase information declines as other firms buy information. In Grossman 
and Stiglitz (1980) another externality of information purchase exists. In their framework 
as X increases, the price level becomes informationally more efficient in the sense that it 
conveys more information about other individuals' expectations at the time decisions are 
made. This externality does not exist in our framework, since the market price cannot 
be observed until after the decisions to purchase information and to supply output 
are made. 
0 Comparative statics of the equilibrium share of informed firms. Equation (19a) may 
be solved explicitly for X* by assuming an interior solution and by setting FP = 0. 
Defining q = aja, and noting that q2 = y/(1 -y) and that v can also be expressed as 
1 + bIy + bX(I - -y) yield'2 
qyffk(2cn)-12 - ( -- 0 < X* < 1. (20) 
The determinants of X* come out clearly in (20). They include industrywide relative to 
firm-specific cost variability (q), total cost variability of the firm (ok), the cost of 
information (c), the number of firms (n), and the price sensitivity of demand (b). The 
equilibrium share of informed firms thus depends only on the structural parameters 
contained in the information set Ti. This property of (20) allows us to separate the 
determination of X* from the determination of the goods market equilibrium. 
Equation (20) shows that the equilibrium share of informed firms falls with the cost 
of information (c) and increases with total cost variability (ok). The share of informed 
firms will also increase with an increase in price sensitivity of demand, since 
dX*/db = (1 + q2)/b2 > 0. 
2From (19a), FT = 0 gives (b/v)2(1 - y)yyj = 2nc. Since all individual terms are positive, taking the 
b 
square root of both sides implies - = {(2nc)/(y(1 - y)a2)} 1/2 Substituting for v = I + by + bX(1 - y) and for V 
- ') = a2 gives (20). 
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Intuitively, as b increases, the equilibrium price becomes more sensitive to changes in 
supply brought about by variations in cost. This increases the incentive to be informed. 
The effect of changes in industrywide relative to firm-specific cost variability on X*, 
dX*/dq = ok(2cn)-112 - 2q(I + b)/b, 
is perhaps the most interesting aspect of expression (20). Figure 2 provides insight into 
the role of q by graphing X* as a function of q. Since the second derivative of X* with 
respect to q is negative, X* has a maximum, X, at q 13 For q < j, dX*/dq > 0: the number 
of informed firms rises as industrywide variability increases relative to firm-specific 
variability. The reason for this is that when there is relatively little variability in a - a-, 
variations in ki - -a arise predominantly from firm-specific causes. Average industry cost 
conditions (a-) then provide a reasonable guide to firms for current industrywide 
conditions. As relative industrywide variability rises, the incentive to collect costly 
information about the current a increases. On the other hand, for q > qt, dX*/dq < 0: 
the number of informed firms falls as industrywide variability increases relative to firm- 
specific variability. When q is relatively large, the variations in ki - -a primarily reflect 
industrywide conditions. Therefore, ki - -a is a good guide for each firm to current 
industrywide conditions. As q increases, this further reduces the incentive for firms to be 
informed about a. 
The above reasoning leads to the conclusion that the incentive to collect information 
is high only in the middle range of values of q for which there is a comparable degree of 
variance in industrywide and firm-specific conditions. Then ai and ki are both poor 
guides to industrywide conditions. In other words, the incentive to collect information is 
high when there is much variability in what firms want to know (a -oa) as well as much 
noise in what they observe (ki - a-). 
The equilibrium share of informed firms (X*) is necessarily bounded by zero and 
one. There is a range of values of q to the left of point A and to the right of point B for 
which X* = 0 is binding and within which no firms will collect information. There may 
FIGURE 2 
EQUILIBRIUM SHARE OF INFORMED FIRMS AS A FUNCTION OF INDUSTRYWIDE RELATIVE 
TO FIRM-SPECIFIC COST VARIABILITY 
-1/b 
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also be a range of values of q for which the upper bound X* = 1 is binding and within 
which every firm will collect information.'4 
Lastly, we point out that the number of firms in the industry (n) also enters the 
determination of the equilibrium share of informed firms. The reason is that the total 
cost of information to the industry (cm) for a given share of informed firms X (=m/n) 
increases with n. Therefore, information costs could affect the number of firms in the 
industry. Nevertheless, we treat n as exogenous and constant, and regard information 
costs as relatively insignificant for determining the number of firms in the industry. 
4. Comparative statics of price and output with endogenous 
determination of information purchase 
* In Section 2 we discussed output and price adjustment to transitory demand and cost 
disturbances while assuming the industry share of informed firms is exogenous. In this 
section we analyze the effects on the equilibrium output and price level of changes in 
different structural parameters, including those that affect the equilibrium share of 
informed firms. In doing so we compare two industry equilibria in which firms have been 
able to identify the structural parameters corresponding to each equilibrium. We do not 
concern ourselves with the process according to which firms learn the structural parameters 
as the industry adjusts from one equilibrium to the other.'5 
To take into account the parameter shifts that cause changes in X*, we first rearrange 
(19a) to obtain 
v- 1 + bX* + by(1 - X*) =b 2( n O2)rk (21) 
Substituting (21) in (14) and (15) gives the following expressions for the equilibrium 
industry price and output in terms of the determinants of X*: 
1cn 
/2 
a- ____ a a 
+ u, (22) 
P F+( n _2) ( c ) (22) 
=P a- 
- 
( ;2)( bO)k (23) 
where P = (a + b-)/(l1 + b). Permanent shifts in demand are captured by changes in the 
intercept (a) of the demand function (2). Permanent cost changes are reflected by changes 
in the average level of industrywide costs (a). An increase in a leads to both higher levels 
of average industry output and price. An increase in a leads to a lower level of 
Y (=P - a) and a higher level of P. 
From (22) and (23) the responses of price and output to changes in transitory 
industrywide cost disturbances (changes in a relative to a given level of a) are given by 
d(a- = (e 
_ny2 (O1) > 0 (24) 
dY ( _ 2cn \ )/2 (25 
d~a - ~) l& ~ / kb~Y< <0. (25) 
14The condition for which the upper bound is binding is X > 1, or [(b/(l + b)]2ok > 8cn. The condition 
for X > 0 is [b2/(l + b)]olk> 8cn. 
5 It is assumed that the process by which firms learn the new parameters of the system is convergent (cf. 
Frydman, 1982). 
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We observe that an increase in c increases the sensitivity of P and Y to a cost increase. 
With higher information costs, fewer firms choose to be informed. As a result, more firms 
reduce output, and prices increase more in response to the cost disturbance. An increase 
in the total variability of firm cost conditions Ofk, holding relative variability 7 constant, 
clearly reduces the sensitivity of P and Y to a cost increase by inducing more firms to 
buy information. 
To examine the effect of an increase in relative cost variability 7y, holding total cost 
variability 0k constant, we obtain from (24) and (25) 
d(dPd( - 
- - y2)-3/2(l - 2"y)o--'(2cn)1/2 (26) 
day 2k 
d(dY/d(a - a)) = 1 2)-3/2(1 - 2'y)rj(2cn)'2b'. (27) 
d'y 2 
The term within the first parentheses of both (26) and (27) is clearly positive since 
,y < 1. Thus, the term within the second parentheses of both conditions determines the 
sign. Specifically, if y > 1/2, (26) is positive and (27) is negative. Hence, the sensitivity of 
price and output increases with higher 7y. For y < 1/2, sensitivity decreases with increas- 
ing 7y. 
This result accords with our finding that the equilibrium share of informed firms is 
greatest for relatively low and relatively high values of q = ('y/(l - 7y))'/2 and reaches a 
maximum for an intermediate value. Here we find that the sensitivities of output and 
price are at a minimum when y takes on the intermediate value of 'y = 1/2 (q = 1). Note, 
however, that the value of y (or q) that minimizes price sensitivity is not identical to the 
value of y (or q) for which X* is at a maximum (X). The discrepancy can be explained 
by observing from (14) that a change in y affects price sensitivity directly through the 
denominator of the price sensitivity coefficient (v = 1 + bX + by(1 - X)) as well as 
indirectly through its effect on X. 
Since the price effect of a cost disturbance depends on the variability of cost 
disturbances through y and ak, it is interesting to look at how price variance ((42 )depends 
22 on a., and on o-u. Using (22), we obtain 
2 2cn for 0 < X* < 1. (28) 
1 - 7/ 
Equation (28) shows that when the effect on information purchase of a change in 
a-2 is taken into account, the price variance due to cost disturbances depends only on y, 
the relative variance. As 4J2 increases relative to uk2, the price variance increases. When 
both o-2 and o-2 increase, however, the price variance remains unchanged because of the 
increased incentive to purchase information. 
5. Conclusions and the direction of further research 
* We have analyzed the role that information plays in price and output adjustment 
when competitive firms with rational expectations cannot directly distinguish between 
industrywide and firm-specific cost disturbances. Among our results, we show that the 
sensitivity of price and output to cost disturbances decreases as more firms choose to 
purchase information about industrywide cost conditions. Assuming that information can 
only be acquired before the revelation of an individual firm's cost conditions, the 
equilibrium share of informed firms is determined by the cost of information, total cost 
variability, and the relative variability of industrywide to firm-specific cost conditions. An 
interesting result is that the incentive to purchase information is greatest when there is a 
similar degree of variability in industrywide and firm-specific cost conditions. Furthermore, 
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the degree of price sensitivity is then relatively small. Another result is that price 
variability due to cost disturbances depends only on the relative variability. 
Our results provide insight into the role of information acquisition when local price 
changes depend on both local and aggregate demand disturbances (Lucas, 1972, 1973, 
1975). Under such conditions firms would have an incentive to acquire information when 
there is variability in both local and aggregate demand. 
In our framework, in contrast to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), all firms may choose 
to become informed. The reason is that, even if all but one firm have acquired 
information, the remaining uninformed firm is still unable to infer from its local 
conditions whether the underlying disturbances are local or aggregate. 
Our results are in one sense consistent with those of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) 
since we find that under certain conditions a free-rider problem may arise, and an 
information market may not exist. An important topic for further research would be to 
analyze how the nature and timing of information availability may cause such a problem. 
Another interesting extension would be to include factor and/or financial markets in 
the model, since prices in these markets may reveal relevant information. We have 
implicitly assumed that firms do not obtain any information from these markets. 
Our analysis has also ruled out the possibility that firms may hold and adjust 
inventories. The nature of inventory decisions in response to cost and demand disturbances 
should be incorporated in a more complete model of firm behavior, since inventory 
adjustment tends to decrease price and output sensitivity to disturbances. Blinder (1982), 
Amihud and Mendelson (1982), and Glick and Wihlborg (1985) have developed models 
of price, output, and inventory adjustment for monopolistic firms. In another paper 
(Glick and Wihlborg, 1984) we develop a model in which the ability to adjust inventories 
may be viewed as potentially substitutable for the purchase of information in response to 
uncertainty about demand as well as cost conditions. 
Appendix 
* The incentive to become informed when individual cost conditions are known. In this Appendix we show 
that all firms will choose to be either informed or uninformed, if their respective information sets at the time 
decisions are made about the purchase of information (T') include their individual cost condition realiza- 
tions ki. 
Evaluation of expression (1) conditional on T'1, following the procedure described in footnote (9), implies 
that a firm's incentive to become informed is given by 
F F I {(-) ( - y2)j - (-) Y2(k, _ 6t)2}-C, (Al C) 
where v = 1 + bX + by(l - X). 
Expression (Al) indicates that for a given share of informed firms (X), the incentive to become informed 
depends on (ki - a )2. The smaller is (ki - aL)2, the greater is the firm's incentive to purchase information. By 
definition, equilibrium in the information market implies that for i = m, F' = 0 (assuming an interior solution). 
Denote by km the cost realization of this marginal firm. 
Under the assumption that n is large, the actual cost conditions of individual firms (ki) are distributed 
normally around a with a variance a 2. Then, knowledge of km and X and knowledge that all firms with 
(k a - C)2 <(km - a)2 are informed would enable the marginal firm to infer (a - a)2 by solving the following 
equation for the share of informed firms: 
km-a- 
_2 
is=Lk e-[(a-a)-(ki-a),2/2a dki (A2) 
J(km-a-) VNeo- 
The revelation of (a 
- 
a)2 to the mth firm implies that its incentive to become informed must be 
reevaluated conditional on an information set T'm that includes (a - a)2 as well as km. 
Denote by FJ, the incentive to become informed conditional on T' . Then 
I (b 2 _ (b )2 2M A)(a -a) a)2k~2 (A3) 
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The only difference between FJ and FJ occurs in the evaluation of the expected profits of being 
informed."6 Recall that FT' = 0 for ki = km. Then, inserting into (A3) the value of (km - a-), obtained by setting 
FT = 0 in (Al), implies that the incentive for the mth firm to become informed is now given by 
T' 
-2 {(ax-Ct)2 (1-72)aa- 2(A4) 
Observe that FJ, < 0 if the magnitude of the current industrywide cost disturbance does not exceed the fixed 
value (1 - 'y2)u!. Then, no firm will purchase information. This result follows from the fact that FM is 
independent of (km - a-). On the other hand, if (a - a)2 is relatively large, all firms will purchase information. 
We assume in the text of the article that no information market can exist under these conditions because of 
fixed costs of information supply and costs of entering and exiting the market to the supplier. 
References 
AMIHUD, Y. AND MENDELSON, H. "The Output-Inflation Relationship: An Inventory Adjustment Approach." 
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 12 (1982), pp. 163-184. 
BLINDER, A. "Inventories and Sticky Prices: More on the Microfoundations of Macroeconomics." American 
Economic Review, Vol. 72 (1982), pp. 334-348. 
DARBY, M.R. "Rational Expectations under Conditions of Costly Information." Journal of Finance, Vol. 31 
(1976), pp. 889-896. 
DEMSETZ, H. "Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint." Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 12 (1969), 
pp. 1-22. 
FRYDMAN, R. "Towards an Understanding of Market Processes." American Economic Review, Vol. 72 (1982), 
pp. 652-668. 
GLICK, R. AND WIHLBORG, C. "Inventories, Information Purchase, and Competitive Industry Equilibrium." 
Working Paper 52-84, University of Southern California School of Business, 1984. 
AND . "Price and Output Adjustment, Inventory Flexibility, and Cost and Demand Disturbances." 
Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 18 (1985), pp. 333-340. 
GROSSMAN, S. AND STIGLITZ, J. "The Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets." American Economic 
Review, Vol. 70 (1980), pp. 293-308. 
AND WEISS, L. "Heterogeneous Information and the Theory of the Business Cycle." Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 90 (1982), pp. 699-727. 
JOHNSTON, J. Econometric Methods. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972. 
LUCAS, R.E. "Expectations and the Neutrality of Money." Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 21 (1972), pp. 
103-124. 
. "Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Trade-Offs." American Economic Review, Vol. 63 
(1973), pp. 326-334. 
. "An Equilibrium Model of the Business Cycle." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 83 (1975), pp. 
1113-1124. 
MORTENSEN, D.T. "A Theory of Wage and Employment Dynamics" in E. Phelps, ed., Microeconomic 
Foundations of Employment and Inflation Theory, New York: Norton, 1970, pp. 167-211. 
PHELPS, E.S. "Introduction: The New Microeconomics in Employment and Inflation Theory" in E. Phelps, ed., 
Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation Theory, New York: Norton, 1970, pp. 1-23. 
SARGENT, T.J. Macroeconomic Theory. New York: Academic Press, 1979. 
16 Identity (A3) is obtained by using the following conditional expectations relations: 
E[a - a-ki, (a - f)2] = E[a - a-ki], E[(a - a)2'I(a - -)2] = (a _ -)' 
E[(a - -)2Iki] = (1 -My )a. 
See Sargent (1979, pp. 207-208). 
This content downloaded from 206.211.139.204 on Thu, 8 Jan 2015 19:14:31 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
